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1 Chapter I – Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) puts forward the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans in its preamble. In Article 301 which titles Peaceful 
uses of the seas, it codifies what are not peaceful uses of the seas, prohibiting the ‘threat 
and use of force’ against territorial integrity and political independence. The issue about 
peaceful uses of the seas seems today not to be that much discussed. Articles were found 
on the subject, however, they date back in the 1980’s some years after the Law of the Sea 
Convention was concluded. Moreover, the few articles on the subject such as ‘The 
Principle of Peaceful Uses in the Law of the Sea and Space Law’1, and ‘Peaceful Uses of 
the Seas: Principles and Complexities’2, both from 1988, ask more questions than they give 
answers. On, the interpretation of Article 301, not much has been said. Can we say more 
today? What about the ‘peaceful uses of the seas’ idea? What does it entail?  
Article 301 is not the only provision using the idea of ‘threat or use of force’. 
Indeed this expression appears in two navigational regimes: the innocent passage and the 
transit passage. By prohibiting the ‘threat or use of force’, the three articles constitute some 
kind of protection against it. However, what type and what level of protection do they 
provide to States facing situations of ‘threat or use of force’ against their territorial 
integrity or political independence? Is it different for each provision? Is it sufficient?  
The general issue here is whether the LOSC is adequate and sufficient to protect a 
State against a ‘threat or use of force’ at sea. To shed more light on this issue, the relevant 
provisions will be addressed. That way, it will be possible to understand their scope, 
differences and limits. 
The analysis will start with the interpretation of Article 301. In the next section will 
be addressed the navigational regimes under the LOSC that is the innocent passage, the 
transit passage and the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Then, will follow a 
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12,	  no.	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1.2 Legal Sources 
The basic and most relevant sources used will be the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the 
1945 Charter of the United Nations, and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Another relevant treaty will be referred to that is the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and references will be made to 
resolutions from the Security Council. The Commentaries on the Law of the Sea 
Convention and on the Charter of the United Nations will be used. Case Law, relevant 
books on the Law of the Sea and International Public Law, and Articles from scholars will 
also be employed. 
 
1.3 Method 
To understand the meaning and scope of the relevant provisions, they will be interpreted, 
using the principles of interpretation of treaties under Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna 
Convention. The first step will be the interpretation of Article 301. This process will go 
through many steps, starting with a primary interpretation, followed by the assessment of 
the ordinary meaning of terms through the context, object and purpose. Then, the specific 
meaning of the terms contained in Article 301 will be evaluated to gain a better precision 
on the scope of the Article.  
Afterwards, the navigational regimes will be addressed. Since they contain the 
same prohibition of ‘threat or use of force’ as under Article 301, the idea will be to 














2 Chapter II – Protection provided under Article 301 
2.1 Introduction 
Article 301 of the LOSC is the core element of this analysis. This Article states: 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties 
shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
To determine what permits this Article, that is the protection it provides and its limits, a 
better understanding of what this Article implies is necessary. To understand its meaning, 
it must be interpret.  
The rules of interpretation of treaties are set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). In Section 3, titled Interpretation of Treaties, and 
consisting of Articles 31 to 33, are established these rules that are to be applied in the 
process of interpretation. However, all the rules are not necessarily relevant in interpreting 
Article 301. Here are the ones, in their order of appearance, that give guidance to go 
through the interpretation process in the present case.  
“A treaty shall be interpreted … in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”3 
 
“The context … shall comprise … the text, including its preamble and annexes…”4  
 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context … [of] [a]ny relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”5  
 
“A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”6 
 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 




In accordance with these international rules of interpretations, Article 301 will be 
addressed taking into consideration the ‘context’ of the LOSC and the ‘object’ and 
‘purpose’ of the treaty. Further, the relevant rules of international law in conjunction with 
the ‘special meaning of terms’ ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ will be used to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(1).	  
4	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(2).	  
5	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(3)(c).	  
6	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(4).	  
7	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  32.	  
assess the meaning of Article 301. However, the interpretation process will begin with the 
assessment of a personal primary meaning of Article 301. 
 
2.3 A primary interpretation of Article 301 
This first or pre- step of interpretation is intended to give a primary sense to the wording of 
Article 301. The general meaning of Article 301 will be done by dividing the text of the 
provision in different parts that will be evaluated using common words. 
Article 301 begins with: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties 
under this Convention”. The rights and duties referred to here can be understood as 
constituting ‘benefits’ and ‘obligations’ contained in the LOSC. They will be addresses in 
a more detailed manner in the next chapter where the maritime zones regimes under the 
LOSC will be discussed. 
The next phrasing of Article 301 is: “States Parties shall refrain from any threat or 
use of force”. In using the expression ‘Sates Parties’, one understands that Article 301 is 
aimed at the ‘countries’ that ratified the LOSC. It is followed by “shall refrain from” which 
means that those countries should avoid or abstain doing something. The term ‘any’, in 
connection with the previous “shall refrain from”, can be understood as meaning ‘none’ of 
the following. In the expression ‘threat or use of force’, the term ‘force’ can be assumed as 
generally mean coercion and representing aggressiveness or even violence. The term 
‘threat’ may be seen as generally meaning a menace, or imminent danger. Thus, the ‘threat 
or use of force’ may be assumed to represent the possibility or actual use of aggressive or 
violent actions. Thus, the main idea is that nothing entering in this category of actions 
should be done. The more general idea of the phrasing “States Parties shall refrain from 
any threat or use of force” can thus be seen as meaning that countries that ratified the 
LOSC should abstain to engage in possible or actual aggressive or violent actions.  
In the following phrasing, “against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State”, the term ‘against’ can be understood as meaning ‘in opposition with’, 
‘contrary to’ or ‘in violation of’. The following expressions ‘territorial integrity’ and 
‘political independence’, without searching, for now, to understand their actual meaning, 
can be assumed to generally representing bigger concepts than the common meaning of the 
words composing them. They cannot be replaced by synonyms. However, in association 
with “of…State”, they can be assumed to represent notions associated to the concept of 
‘country’ that is a functional unit or structure. As such, they can be assumed to relate to the 
‘state’ or ‘specific conditions’ of this structure. The term ‘any’ in the expression ‘of any 
State’ would mean here ‘none’ of the countries. In sum, the expression “against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State” can be assumed to mean: in 
violation of specific states of a country’s structure of none of the countries.  
The last part of the wording of Article 301 is: “or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”. 
Here, the term ‘or’ links the previous “shall refrain from any threat or use of force” to “in 
any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations”. This could be seen as the third element against which 
countries that are bound by the Convention shall abstain to possibly or actually engage in 
aggressive or violent actions. The use of the term ‘any’ in “any other manner”, can be seen 
here as meaning ‘all other possible ways’. The next expression, “inconsistent with”, may 
be seen as meaning ‘incompatible with’ or ‘contrary to’. In the following “principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”, the term ‘embodied’ can 
be replaced by ‘included in’. The other words here are clear in their primary sense. 
However, these ‘principles of international law’ constitute elements of a certain category 
of law. They need to be pointed out, but will be given more attention in the following 
sections. The phrasing “or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations” can thus be seen as 
meaning: none of all the possible ways contrary to elements of a certain category of law 
included in the Charter of the United Nations. 
In using the common meaning of words, Article 301 could be read as: countries that 
ratified the LOSC should abstain to engage in possible or actual aggressive or violent 
actions in violation of specific states of a countries’ structure of none of the countries or 
abstain to engage in none of all the possible ways contrary the elements of a certain 
category of law included in the Charter of the United Nations.  
Concerning its heading, Article 301 titles ‘Peaceful uses of the seas’, its primary 
meaning is quite obvious. In fact, ‘peaceful’ is related to the absence of violence and the 
idea of respect could be replaced by the terms ‘pacific’ or ‘non-violent and respectful’. The 
term ‘uses’ may be replaced with usage or utilization. However, to be more precise, the use 
or utilization of something describes the action of doing something with a specific thing 
and in a particular goal which may be regarded as an activity. As a whole, ‘Peaceful uses 
of the seas’ means: activities taking place in the seas conducted in a non-violent and 
respectful manner. 
In generalizing the wording of Article 301 using common vocabulary, it gives a 
global sense to it but removes its precision and thus does not give more insight on its 
scope. However, this work helps to categorize and identify what needs to be more 
investigated.  
The larger concepts included in Article 301 because they cannot be understood 
primarily are causing some questioning about their actual meaning. Indeed, how to identify 
the unambiguous and precise meaning of expressions such as: “threat or use of force”, 
“territorial integrity”, “political independence”, and “any other manner inconsistent with 
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”? As 
Linderfalk writes it when talking about what he calls “this (very first) introductory act of 
interpretation” using conventional language, “[w]here the ordinary meaning of a treaty 
provision is vague, using the context will make the text more precise” and “[w]here the 
ordinary meaning is ambiguous, using the context will help to determine which one of 
several possible meanings is correct, and which one is not”8. Thus, to have a more precise 
understanding of Article 301, one must replace it in its “context”.  
 
2.4 The ordinary meaning of Article 301: the context, object and purpose 
“A treaty shall be interpreted … in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”9 
 The concept of ‘ordinary meaning’ is not defined in the Vienna Convention and 
does not have a unique definition. However, the purpose of the doctrine can help to seize 
the concept. In fact, the idea of this doctrine is that “texts should be understood by different 
people in the same way” that is “legal texts should be understandable to the general public, 
as well as to judges and sophisticated practitioners”10. It follows that the ordinary meaning 
of a term can be understood as its general or common meaning as it has been done above. 
However, here this ordinary meaning must be determined through the context, object and 
purpose of the treaty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ulf	  Linderfalk,	  "On	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Treaties:	  The	  Modern	  International	  Law	  as	  
Expressed	  in	  the	  1969	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,"	  ed.	  SpringerLink	  
(Dordrecht:	  Springer	  Netherlands,	  2007).	  
9	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(1).	  
10	  Brian	  G.	  Slocum,	  "The	  Ordinary	  Meaning	  of	  Rules,"	  In	  Problems	  of	  Normativity,	  Rules	  
and	  Rule-­‐Following.	  Book	  to	  be	  released.	  vol.	  111(2014).	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435462	  (accessed	  21	  August	  
2014).	  
As described in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the context of a treaty 
comprises its text which includes its preamble and annexes. That way, one may considered 
the place occupied by the article in the text, but also the concepts and expressions it 
includes and that can be found elsewhere in the text of the treaty. Also, in addition to the 
context, Article 31(1) states that the interpretation must also be done “in the light of its 
object and purpose”. In its ordinary meaning, the object of a treaty can be assumed to refer 
to the ‘thing’ in question or what the treaty is about and the purpose may be seen as the 
reason or objective of the treaty. Here will be added the ‘subject’ of the treaty which is a 
concept that comes between the object and purpose and can be understood as the concern 
of the treaty. Since the object, subject, and purpose of a treaty are present in its text, these 
will be addressed together with the context.  
The object, subject, and purpose of the LOSC are presented in its Preamble. The 
object around which the Convention is centred is the law of the sea. The subject is well 
established in the Preamble: the codification of the law of the sea by addressing as a whole 
“all issues relating to [it]” since these problems are closely interrelated.11 The purpose of 
the LOSC is the “desire to settle” those issues and “[contribute] to the maintenance of 
peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world” or said differently to “[strengthen] 
… security, cooperation, and friendly relations among all nations”12.   
As seen above, the text describing Article 301 expresses that countries bounded by 
the Convention shall abstain from engaging in some types of violent actions against other 
countries. Put in relation with its heading, non-violent and respectful activities conducted 
in the seas, and recalling the use of a negative verb ‘abstain from’, Article 301 could be 
understood as codifying what are not peaceful uses of the seas. What one could call ‘non-
peaceful uses of the seas’ can be defined as “any threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations.” There is only a second occurrence of the principle of ‘peaceful uses’ in the 
Convention. In the Preamble is stated the “desirability of establishing through this 
Convention… a legal order for the seas and oceans which [among others] will promote the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans”13. It can be assumed that the ‘peaceful uses of the 
seas’ is one of the goals of the Convention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  LOSC,	  Preamble,	  paras.	  2,	  4,	  5,	  and	  8.	  
12	  LOSC,	  Preamble,	  para.	  2	  and	  8.	  
13	  LOSC,	  Premable,	  para.	  5.	  
The LOSC also refers to ‘peaceful purposes’ of the seas in its sections describing 
the regime of the high seas, Article 88: “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful 
purposes”, and the regime of the Area, Article 141: “[t]he Area shall be open to use 
exclusively for peaceful purposes”. The expressions ‘reserved for’ and ‘use exclusively 
for’, describing the ‘peaceful purposes’, may be primarily understood as meaning, in order, 
‘restricted to’ or ‘limited to’ and ‘utilization only for’ or ‘solely for’. Both express the idea 
of ‘for nothing but’ what follows. To asses the primary meaning of “shall be” it must be 
considered that those two maritime zones are opened to all States, one under the principle 
of the freedom of the high seas (Article 87) and the other one under the common heritage 
of mankind (Article 136). Keeping in mind this idea, the expression ‘shall be’ should be 
seen here as expressing an aspiration for these zone to stay peaceful since they are not 
under any State jurisdiction and thus remain subject to the good faith of States for the 
application of the rules governing them under the LOSC. The ordinary meaning of the 
expression ‘peaceful purposes’ could be seen as non-violent goals, aims or objectives. 
However, put in connection with ‘shall be’, ‘peaceful purposes’ could be seen as 
expressing more specifically the idea of an intention, finality or ends. In this regard, 
Articles 88 and 141 may be seen as meaning that the high seas and the Area ‘are meant to 
be used for nothing but non-violent and respectful ends’. Thus, in comparison to the 
ordinary meaning of ‘peaceful uses’, non-violent and respectful activities, ‘peaceful 
purpose’, non-violent and respectful ends, is of a less practical caracter and more the 
expression of a global character that should define the high seas and Area. However, in a 
general way, they express pretty much the same thing. 
As discussed earlier, the description under Article 301 is codifying the prohibition 
of the ‘threat or use of force’ at sea and may be understood as the opposite idea expressed 
in its heading which titles ‘Peaceful uses of the seas’. As this last principle constitute one 
of the goals of the LOSC, the threat or use of force at sea may thus be assumed to be an 
issue the Convention is meant to settle. The expression ‘threat or use of force’ is also 
related to three of the regimes set out in the Convention. More specifically, it is codified in 
the provisions relating to the innocent passage in the territorial sea (LOSC A19(2)(a)) and 
in the transit passage regime in straits used for international navigation (LOSC A39(1)(b)). 
Also, Article 54 associated to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage states that 
Article 39 applies to that regime. The wording between these provisions is quite similar. 
However, in comparison with Article 301, there is an important difference. Indeed, in 
addition to the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the ‘territorial integrity’ and 
‘political independence’, Articles 19(2)(a) and 39(1)(b) also prohibits the threat or use of 
force against the ‘sovereignty’. These principles do not appear elsewhere than in these 
three provisions. As a general provision, Article 301 applies to all the regimes set out in the 
Convention, and it could be said that it applies particularly to those that do not include a 
specific prohibition of the threat or use of force. Adding to that remark, we observe that the 
maritime zones containing a specific provision relating to the prohibition of threat or use of 
force, that is the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and straits used for international 
navigation, are those under which States enjoy or may enjoy sovereignty. That way, Article 
301 would thus particularly apply to the other maritime zones where the jurisdiction of the 
State is restricted or where the freedom of the seas applies. That way, it would have been 
irrelevant or even a mistake to include the principle of ‘sovereignty’ in Article 301. 
However, Article 301, as the two others, contains a third element against which the threat 
or use of force may not be directed: ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the principles 
of international law’. This would thus replace the principle of sovereignty. 
 On the ordinary meaning in light of the purposes and object of the treaty, the 
expressions ‘territorial integrity’, ‘political independence’ and ‘in any other manner 
inconsistent with the principles of international law’, not much more can be said. Indeed, 
as seen above, they seem to be elements against which State shall not engage in the ‘threat 
or use of force’.  
 
2.5 Article 301 in a broader context – Relevant rules of international law, special 
meaning of terms and supplementary means of interpretation 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Since the previous steps did not give that much insight on the scope of the Article 301, 
other rules of interpretation will be used. 
Under the expression ‘Article 301 in a broader context’, the author refers to two 
other principles of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention, that is the relevant rules 
of international law, Article 31(3)(c), the special meaning of terms, Article 31(4), and the 
supplementary means of interpretation, Article 32, which, in order, can be read as follows: 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context… any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”14 
 
“A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  3(c).	  
15	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(4).	  
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”16 
 
These techniques will be addressed at the same time because it may be difficult to discuss 
them separately. In fact, in the present context, the special meaning of terms will be 




In order to apply these techniques of interpretation, one have to understand their wording. 
The ordinary meaning of Article 31(3)(c) is quite obvious, it refers to those rules that apply 
between the countries that are members of the treaty interpreted. Here, the relevant rules of 
international law are set out in the UN Charter as we will see later.  
Article 31(4) seems also clear, but in order to gain a better understanding, its 
French version17 was consulted. This other interpretation technique refers to Article 33 of 
the Vienna Convention. In its third paragraph, Article 33 states: “The terms of the treaty 
are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text” and as the French version is 
considered “equally authentic”18 to the English one, one may refer to it. The precision 
gained this way refers to the expression “A special meaning shall be given to a term” of 
Article 31(4). In referring to the French version, “[u]n terme sera entendu dans un sens 
particulier”, this part of Article 31(4) may be literally translated into: ‘a term will be 
understood in a special meaning’. The ordinary meaning of the last part of Article 31(4) “if 
it is established that the parties so intended” is quite clear. As a whole, Article 31(4) means 
that it must be demonstrated that the parties attributed a special meaning to a term for this 
term to correspond to that special meaning. However, the assessment of the special 
meaning of the terms included in Article 301 is not directly feasible. Indeed, the LOSC 
does not contain any definition of these and the documents that could constitute 
supplementary means of interpretation 19  such as the conferences records and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  32.	  
17	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  31(4)	  in	  its	  French	  version:	  "Un	  terme	  sera	  entendu	  
dans	  un	  sens	  particulier	  s’il	  est	  établi	  que	  telle	  était	  l’intention	  des	  parties."	  The	  
writer	  of	  this	  paper	  native	  language	  is	  French.	  
18	  Vienna	  Convention,	  Article	  85.	  
19	  This	  technique	  refers	  to	  Article	  32	  -­‐	  Supplementary	  means	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Vienna	  Convention.	  
commentaries are limited in such a way that “there is no interpretation of the article on the 
record”20 and there are few commentaries on Article 301. Thus, we will see that giving the 
fact that the LOSC and Article 301 demonstrates a direct link to the UN Charter, and 
considering that the rules of international law relating to Article 301 are codified in the UN 
Charter, the special meaning of the terms included in Article 301 will be assessed through 
these relevant rules of international law.  
Article 32 may not be as clear as the previous rules of interpretation. In fact, when 
reading it, one understands that it is non-exclusive since the term ‘including’, since it 
presupposes that the two elements that follows in the wording constitute examples of what 
a ‘supplementary mean of interpretation’ may be. The term ‘including’ can thus be read as 
‘not limited to’. But, from the wording that follows “in order to confirm... or to 
determine…” and the link to Article 31, one clearly understands that the utility of 
supplementary means is to validate the interpretation developed using Article 31 or to 
clarify or replace the meaning found with Article 31 if it does not give any sense. About 
the term ‘circumstances’, one of the examples given in the article, it relates to the “general 
conditions under which a treaty was concluded; the states-of-affairs by which the 
conclusion of a treaty was affected or influenced.”21 In the present case, the supplementary 
means of interpretation will be used to interpret the rules of international law contained in 
the UN Charter. The sources will consist of the literature written about these. 
The three techniques of interpretation will be used in connection.  
 
2.5.3 Relevance of the Charter of the United Nations 
To interpret the UN Charter, the same rules of interpretation apply. Let’s start with the 
interpretation of its context, and object and purposes and compare with Article 301 of the 
LOSC to establish their linkage.  
Both documents are under the auspices of the United Nations, one from 1945 
creating the Organization and establishing its rules, the UN Charter, and the other one 
concluded later, in 1982, by the same Organization.  
In its Preamble, the LOSC refers directly to the UN Charter: “the codification and 
progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  301	  -­‐	  Peaceful	  
Uses	  of	  the	  Seas	  (V),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  Online	  
(Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publichers,	  2013),	  154.	  
21	  Linderfalk.	  The	  original	  text	  is	  in	  italic.	  
to [the purposes of the LOSC] … in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations as set forth in the Charter”.22 When referring to the Principles of the UN, 
the LOSC refers to Article 223 of the Charter that establishes the rules of international law 
governing the Organization’s action, but also to other rules of international law included in 
the text of the Charter. In addition to these rules of international law, the LOSC also 
applies the Organization’s purposes. In fact, the principles of the UN Charter are directly 
linked to the purposes of the Organization as stated in Article 2: “The Organization and its 
Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the 
following Principles”. As such, the LOSC would constitute a subsequent agreement to the 
UN Charter applying its provisions to a particular area which are the seas.  
Article 301 also makes a direct reference to the UN Charter when it says: “or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations”. Those principles that are relevant in the interpretation of Article 
301 are the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the inherent right of self-defence of 
States, set out respectively in Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the Charter.  
This direct reference to the UN Charter in Article 301 of the LOSC, the more 
general reference in its Preamble, and the fact that the Convention was concluded by the 
UN make the Charter relevant in the interpretation of Article 301. 
In addition, it is recognized that Article 301 was “inspired by Article 2, paragraph 4 
of the UN Charter”24 which states: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 







2.5.4 Relevant rules of international law: Article 2(4) 
Article 2(4), commonly known as the principle of prohibition of the threat or use of force, 
has the status of rule of international law, but is also considered “to be part of customary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  LOSC,	  Preamble,	  para.	  8.	  
23	  LOSC,	  Article	  2,	  is	  introduced	  by:	  "[t]he	  Organization	  and	  its	  Members	  ...	  shall	  act	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  following	  Principles.",	  followed	  by	  seven	  paragraphs.	  
24	  Bernard	  H.	  	  Oxman,	  "The	  Third	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea:	  
The	  Ninth	  Session	  (1980),"	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  75,	  (1981):	  237.	  
25	  "Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,"	  ed.	  United	  Nations	  (United	  Nations,	  24	  October	  
1945),	  Article	  2(4).	  
international law”26 and was recognised that way by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Judgement of 
June 27, 198627. Except for some wording differences, Article 301 of the LOSC is 
essentially reaffirming Article 2(4) for the sea areas. Thus it may be assumed that Article 
301 of the LOSC also codifies that prohibition more specifically applied to the seas.  
Article 2(4) is, as the other principles included in the UN Charter, linked to the 
purposes of the United Nations stated in Article 1 of which “to maintain international 
peace and security… [in taking, among others] measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace…”28. One can make a parallel here to the purposes of the LOSC found in its 
preamble: “the maintenance of peace”, the “strengthening of peace, security” to which 
Article 301 as a description of one of the issue of the law of the sea and its prohibition is 
answering.  As such, Article 301 also intended to maintain and strengthen international 
peace and security.  
In their wording, Article 2(4) and Article 301 use a different expression to 
designate States that are bound by the principle. In using the expression ‘States Parties’, 
Article 301 refers to the States and entities29 that signed and ratified or confirmed, or 
accessed the Convention as can be understood from its final provisions. It thus relates to 
the more general idea or ordinary meaning of ‘members’ of the Convention. The 
expression ‘[a]ll members’ in Article 2(4) relates to those States that follows the process of 
signature and ratification of the treaty, set out in Article 110. As stated in the Charter, the 
members are composed by the original members30 and the States that will be admitted after 
the GA has decided to “upon the recommendation of the Security Council”31. The 
expressions ‘State Parties’ and ‘[a]ll members’ are thus referring to the same general idea 
of members of the treaties.   
In using “inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations” (Article 301) and “inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations” (Article 2(4)), both articles refer to the same thing: the principles of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Albrecht	  Randelzhofer,	  "Article	  2(4),"	  in	  The	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  A	  
Commentary,	  ed.	  Bruno	  Simma(New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  133,	  para.	  
61.	  See	  fn.	  176	  of	  this	  page	  for	  references	  from	  authors	  sharing	  the	  same	  view.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  133,	  para	  61.	  See	  ICJ	  report	  1986...	  
28	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  1(1)	  
29	  The	  term	  entities	  is	  meant	  to	  represent	  the	  parties	  that	  are	  not	  States	  but	  are	  
authorized	  to	  sign	  the	  LOSC,	  as	  state	  in	  Article	  305.	  
30	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  3.	  
31	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  4(2).	  
international law included in the Charter. In fact, as seen above, the purposes of the UN 
listed in Article 1 of the Charter are directly linked to the principles or rules of 
international law of Article 2. Thus, Article 2(4), one of these principles, in referrig to the 
purposes in Article 1 also refers to all the other principles listed with it in Article 2, but 
also to other rules of international law included in the Charter such as the recognized 
inherent right of self-defence. In fact, Article 51, the inherent right of self-defence, part of 
Chapter VII, constitutes as the title of the section indicates, an ‘[a]ction with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and act of aggression’, thus one of the measures 
referred to in Article 1(1), the purposes of the UN to which Article 2(4) is linked. Thus, 
Article 301 becomes a mean to respond to the breach of the rule of international law of 
Article 2(4). In addition to Article 2(4), Article 301 also refers to all the principles of 
international law that can be found in the UN Charter, meaning not only those in Chapter I 
32.  
The ordinary meaning of “in their international relations”, an additional element of 
Article 2(4) in comparison to Article 301, can be assumed to express that the principle of 
prohibition of threat or use of force concerns the conduct of States amongst themselves. It 
follows that the article does not apply to States internal affairs33. Even though nothing in 
this matter is written in Article 301, it can be assumed to already being clearly stated 
within the phrasing “States Parties shall refrain from … against … any State”, which 
expresses States to States relations. Moreover, since Articles 2(4) and 301 are expressing 
the same rule of international law, we may assume that it is also only applicable to States 
relations within Article 301.  
 The differences in wording do not account for much between articles 301 and 2(4), 
as seen above, and the ordinary meaning of these expressions is clear. As such, both 
articles are meant to regulate the conduct of States amongst themselves in relation to the 
threat or use of force and refer to the principles of international law included in the 
Charter.  
However, about their similarities, it is a different story. In fact, the ordinary 
meaning of such terms as ‘threat or use of force’, ‘territorial integrity’, and ‘political 
independence’, as seen earlier, is not sufficient to understand the scope of these concepts. 
Also, the UN Charter does not contain any description or definition of the terms employed 
in the principles of prohibition of the threat or use of force. Their object is different and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  	  154,	  para.	  301.5.	  
33	  Randelzhofer,	  	  121,	  para.	  29.	  
knowing that the UN Charter’s object is the UN Nations does not give any clue in 
interpreting Article 301.  
Thus, to further the process, the special meaning of these terms will now be 
discussed by using subsequent agreement and the literature associated with Article 2(4) 
such as commentaries. That would account for the use of both the rules of interpretation of 
Article 31(4), special meaning, and Article 32, the supplemantary means of interpretation, 
of the Vienna Convention applied to the UN Charter.  
2.5.4.1 Special meaning – Literature on Article 2(4) 
The core element of Article 301 is this concept of ‘force’ to which are related two different 
concepts: the threat of force and the use of force. In the literature written about Article 
2(4), the concept of ‘force’ is, in the general view, “limited to armed forces”34, the term 
‘armed forces’ being employed in the preamble of the UN Charter, paragraph 7, and 
Articles 41, 43, 44, 46 and 47 of Chapter VII – Action with respect to the threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The reading of these five articles 
makes it clear that the use of armed forces constitutes one of the measures to be employed 
agints the breach of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. More interestingly, Article 
44 links ‘force’ to ‘armed forces’ when it states “When the Security Council has decided to 
use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it [Security Council] to 
provide armed forces…”35. Moreover, ‘armed forces’ relates to military forces36, it is thus 
difficult to associate the ‘threat or use of force’ to other organisations than the army which 
is under the State’s control.  
It is not clear what “forms of participation in acts of violence committed by military 
organized groups can be said to constitute ‘force’”37. However, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations 
Declaration) gives some examples of forms both the threat and the use of force could take: 
“[violating] the existing international boundaries of another State” or “[violating] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Ibid.,	  117.	  See	  fn.	  25	  of	  the	  page	  of	  this	  reference	  for	  concurring	  views.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  118.	  See	  fn.	  27	  on	  the	  page	  of	  the	  document	  refered	  to	  here	  for	  concurring	  
views.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  118,	  para.	  18.	  The	  author	  refers	  to	  the	  travaux	  préparatoire	  without	  giving	  
any	  precision	  and	  to	  the	  Friendly	  Relations	  Declaration	  (para.	  19).	  
37	  Ibid.,	  p.	  120,	  para.	  24.	  
international lines of demarcation”38. One of the purposes of this Declaration of 1970 was 
to “contribute to the strengthening of world peace”39 by recalling the principles of 
international law embodied in the UN Charter of which the prohibition of the threat or use 
of force of Article 2(4).  
The use of force can be direct or indirect. The use of direct force constitutes an 
“open[ed] incursion of regular military forces into the territory of another State or cross-
border shooting into that territory” 40. The Friendly Relations Declaration gives some 
specific examples of forms the direct use of force could take: war of aggression, acts of 
reprisal, “forcible action which deprives peoples … of their right to self-determination and 
freedom and independence”, military occupation41. 
On the other hand, indirect forces is “the participation of one State in the use of 
force by another State…” and a “State’s participation in the use of force by unofficial 
bands organized in a military manner”42 such as “mercenaries or [giving] assistance to 
rebels who perpetrate acts of violence in another State’s territory”43 . The Friendly 
Relations Declaration gives some examples of forms the indirect use of force could take44: 
“organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including 
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State” or “organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts…”45.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  "Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  Concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  
Co-­‐Operation	  among	  States	  in	  Accordance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,"	  in	  
GA	  Res.	  2625	  (XXV),	  ed.	  UN	  GAOR	  (1970),	  p.122.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  121.	  
40	  Randelzhofer,	  	  119,	  para.	  22.	  See	  fn.	  40	  of	  the	  page	  referred	  to	  here	  where	  the	  
author	  refers	  to	  concurring	  references.	  
41	  "Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  Concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  
Co-­‐Operation	  among	  States	  in	  Accordance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,"	  p.	  
122-­‐3.	  
42	  Randelzhofer,	  	  119,	  para.	  22.	  See	  fn.	  42	  on	  the	  page	  reffered	  to	  here	  where	  the	  
author	  makes	  a	  reference	  to	  another	  text	  to	  compare.	  The	  author	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  
Friendly	  Relations	  Declaration	  on	  p.	  120,	  para.	  25	  in	  which	  a	  description	  of	  indirect	  
forces	  is	  made.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  p.	  119,	  para.	  22.	  
44	  Ibid.,	  p.	  120,	  para.	  25.	  
45	  "Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  Concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  
Co-­‐Operation	  among	  States	  in	  Accordance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,"	  p.	  
123.	  
From the examples presented before, we may extract some of the characteristics of 
the use of force, regardless of its direct or indirect character. The ‘use of force’ constitutes 
an organized coercive action against another State, breaching the principles of international 
law. The fact that it is organized implies that it has a definite goal which is to be reached 
by the use of violence. Also, in using violence, it is fully assumed that it would cause 
damage. Since it is realized by the armed forces or ‘in a military manner’, it means that the 
action will reach a certain scale in size, damage or violence or any combination of these 
elements.   
The expression ‘threat of force’ may also be replace by ‘threat to the peace’46. It is 
also an organized action, but comparison with the ‘use of force’, it expresses the possibility 
to use force, or even more the intention to use force or to violate the peace. It has been less 
studied and considered than the ‘use of force’. Many factors can explain it such as the high 
tolerance of States, the fact that threat of force has not, in itself, been invoked in the 
practice, and that the threat of force constitutes often the first step before the actual ‘use of 
force’ which then becomes the issue. Also, a threat may be used instead of force to “speed 
up the peaceful settlement of dispute”47. Another difficulty may be that it is difficult to 
qualify an act as a threat. In fact, “[o]nly a threat directed towards a specific reaction on the 
part of the target State is unlawful under the terms of Art. 2(4)48.  Thus, to constitute a 
threat of force, the action of threatening must clearly demonstrate the intention to make use 
of coercion to attain a particular objective and must be understood as such by the target 
State. Examples of forms that the threat of the use of force could take are given in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration: propaganda for wars of aggression49.  
 ‘Territorial integrity’, ‘political independence’ and ‘any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations’ (Article 2(4)) or ‘principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’ (Article 301) can be considered as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  As	  seen	  above,	  ‘peaceful’	  relates	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  violence	  and	  'force'	  to	  violence.	  
That	  way,	  'peaceful'	  relates	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  force	  so	  'peace'	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  force.	  
Thus,	  ‘threat	  of	  force',	  positive,	  may	  be	  replaced	  by	  'threat	  against	  peace',	  negative,	  or,	  
shorter,	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  peace'.	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forms of prohibition of force50. The two firsts forms “are not intended to restrict the scope 
of the prohibition of the use of force”51, they are not limited to those cases “when a State’s 
territorial existence or the status of its political independence is altered or abolished”, but 
“cover any possible kind of transfrontier use of armed forces”52. Here integrity means 
inviolability53. These two forms of prohibition of force cover most of the cases. The third 
may be seen as filling the gaps of the 2 previous ones.54 
The UN Charter provides for three exceptions to the prohibition of use of force 
which means that force is lawful in those particular cases. Articles 53 and 107 refers to 
States enemies to States signatories to the UN Charter during the Second World War. As 
all of these enemy States have now signed the Charter, this exception is thus outdated55. 
The second exception is related to the role of the SC to maintain peace and security and its 
right to decide to engage in the use of force when it deems necessary56. In fact, the SC has 
the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”57 
which refers to the first purpose of the United Nations: “to maintain international peace 
and security”, Article 1(1). This article further states that in this objective, the United 
Nations may “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace…”58. This refers to Chapter VII that titles ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the UN Charter’, chapter under 
which the SC has the responsibility to “determine the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 41 [the use of armed 
forces]…”59.  
The third exception, and the most important in the framework of this analysis is the 
‘inherent right self-defence’ covered by Article 51 of the Charter:  
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
This right applies under Article 301 since it is one of the principles of international law the 
Charter covers60.  
 
2.5.5 Relevant Rules of International Law – Article 51  
The prohibition of the use of force codified in Article 2(4) is associated to a certain number 
of collective measures covered by Articles 39 to 51 of the UN Charter and thus Article 2(4) 
must be understood in this larger context61. In fact, as seen above, Article 2(4), the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force, is related to the purposes of the Organization in 
Article 1(1), to maintain international peace and security, that refers to measures set out in 
Chapter VII, ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts 
of Aggression’. Articles 39 to 50 explain the process if a State relies directly on the SC to 
take the situation in charge. The SC is then the one that will defined the situation and 
decide what measures will be undertaken. On the contrary, Article 51 codifies the inherent 
right of self-defence by States which is the natural right of all States to rely on themselves 
to respond to an offensive situation. It can take the form of a collective or individual 
response. However, the later, regarded as the unilateral use of force, is more present in 
State practice than is used the system of collective defence62 since the SC may decide, in 
certain cases, not to use force (Article 41) or when unanimity is not reached between the 
five permanent members, each having a veto63. Here, only Article 51 will be addressed 
since the procedures under which the SC council take a decision is on a case-by-case basis 
and may, as such, be complex to analyse. 
Regarding the conditions for exercising the inherent right of self-defence “the State 
concerned [must have] been the victim of an armed attack” and “it is the State which is the 
victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  	  154,	  para.	  301.5.	  
61	  Randelzhofer,	  	  117.	  
62	  Albrecht	  Randelzhofer,	  "Article	  51,"	  in	  The	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  A	  
Commentary,	  ed.	  Bruno	  Simma(New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  789-­‐90.	  
See	  also...	  
63	  Randelzhofer,	  "Article	  2(4),"	  126,	  para.	  43.	  
attacked”64 which means that the act of which the State is victim must meet the criteria of 
an armed attack. Other conditions may be considered: the principles of proportionality and 
necessity in the response by the victim State to the aggressor State, and the SC control65. In 
relation with this last element, Article 51 clearly states that when the State exercise its 
inherent right of self-defence and takes measures, those “shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council … to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security”. 
 
2.5.5.1 Special meaning – Literature on Article 51 
No definition has been agreed for the term ‘armed attack’66. However, the ICJ set out a 
description in its 1986 Nicaragua v. United States Judgement.  The Court considers this 
definition be a “general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as 
constituting armed attacks”:  
…an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces 
across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack 
conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein’. This description, 
contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law. The 
Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may 
apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an 
operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack 
rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces. But the 
Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes … assistance to rebels in 
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support… 67 
 
The term ‘aggression’ is defined as follows: “the use of armed forces by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”68. It is quite similar to what 
prohibits Article 2(4). In fact, the ‘use of armed forces’ is similar to ‘the use of force’ of 
Article 2(4), the term ‘force’ being associated to the armed forces. However, the main 
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differences are that the definition of ‘aggression’ does not include the ‘threat or use of 
force’ and adds the principle of ‘sovereignty’. As such, it may be said that an ‘aggression’ 
is a form of ‘use of force’ and thus a example of it. 
Regarding the specific characteristics of an armed attack, it “always presupposes a 
violation of Article 2(4)”, thus a breach of the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and 
involves the use of force “on a relatively large scale and with substantial effect”69, thus “a 
certain level of violence”70. To differentiate between an ‘armed attack’ and an ‘act of 
aggression’, it is recognized that the former is narrower than the later71. From what 
precedes, it could be said that an ‘armed attack’ constitutes an aggression of high intensity, 
without having any clear legal references to precise what this level refers to exactly.  
Provision 3 of the definition of ‘act of aggression’ in the Annex of GA Resolution 
3314 presents some examples of acts that could also be considered an ‘armed attack’ if one 
keeps in mind the specific character of an ‘armed attack’72 which is that it happens on a 
larger scale and have important effects in comparison with an ‘act of aggression’. These 
examples are: invasion, bombardment, cross-border shooting, blockade, attack on State 
position abroad, breach of stationing agreements, placing territory at another state’s 
disposal, and participation in the use of force by military organized unofficial groups73. 
The former elements refer to acts committed by armed forces and the latter refers to non 
regular forces. This last element is described in Article 3(g) of the Annex of GA 
Resolution 3314 that states: 
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or it substantial involvement therein. 
 
It constitutes an indirect use of force74 and the Nicaragua v. United States Judgement refers 
to it when it says that an ‘armed attack’ is understood as “not merely actions by regular 
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armed forces”75. Thus, in the understanding of the court, the groups referred to in that 
provision conducting any of the acts described under the other provisions of Article 3 of 
the Annex of GA Resolution 3314, and acting in the manner regular armed forces would 
have, conduct an ‘armed attack’. It is important to underline as stated in Article 3(g) that 
these groups must be send “by or on behalf of a State” so they are non-State actor with 
private aims but employed to act for one State. The Court adds about what is not 
considered as an ‘armed attack’ but as a ‘threat or use of force’: “assistance to rebels in the 
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support”76. 
The expression ‘armed attack’ of Article 51 is a narrower expression that the ‘threat 
or use of force’ of Article 2(4), since “an ‘armed attack’ always presupposes a violation of 
Article 2(4)”, contrary to the ‘threat or use of force’ that does not necessarily imply a 
breach of Article 2(4).77 
To sum up, an ‘armed attack’ is “an attack of one State against another of some 
gravity and magnitude”78 that can be direct or indirect, but always violates the prohibition 
of threat or use of force. 
When it has been established that the action was actually an ‘armed attack’, then 
the State victim of the attack may use its inherent individual or collective right of self-
defence. However, some conditions apply of which the necessity and proportionality of the 
response in comparison with the characteristics of the armed attack.  
The principles of proportionality and necessity are the twin concepts79 that is they 
go together. They are part of customary international law. They are “essential components” 
to legitimate the use of force80. In the Judgement of the Nicaragua v. United States Case, 
the “Parties… agree…that whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on 
observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in 
self-defence”81. Also, the Court states that “self-defence would warrant only measures 
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well 
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established in customary international law”82. Thus for self-defence measures to be lawful 
and justified, they must be proportional to the armed attack of which the State is victim and 
necessary as they are the only solution for the State to defend itself. 
Three conditions may be applied for the state of necessity to be fulfilled: “the 
existence of an essential interest; this essential interest must be threatened by an imminent 
grave danger; the measure taken in the name of necessity must have been the only way to 
safeguard this essential interest and shall not detract another State essential interest”83. It 
may be considered that this ‘interest’ refers to those against which the threat or use of force 
is prohibited, that is to say the ‘territorial integrity’, the ‘political independence’, and ‘any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations’, as self-defence (Article 
51) being a measure to answer a breach of the prohibition of threat or use of force (Article 
2(4)). On the second element, the term ‘imminent’ must be understood as meaning 
immediacy or proximity84, “the requirement of immediacy is in fact inherent to the text of 
Article 51”85. However, the immediacy of an ‘armed attack’ is determined by the State 
victim, which may entail a bias. On the third requirement, it is understood that the use of 
force as a measure of self-defence must be a last resort86, “after all peaceful means have 
failed”87. Concerning the ‘proportionality’ of countermeasures, they must be equivalent to 
the seriousness of the armed attack that is the damage must be equivalent. This equivalence 
must be considered in the means used to respond to the attack88, but also in light of the 
aims of this response89. 
There exists no such right as of anticipatory or preventive self-defence, it is 
prohibited by Article 51 90 . However, “the right of self-defence... frequently has a 
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preventative element” and “is most commonly asserted in the face of a prior attack or 
series of armed attacks”91.  
Article 51 restates the authority of the SC in maintaining the international peace 
and security conferred by the member States under Article 24(1). Indeed, the right of self-
defence can be used “until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary” and 
while exercising this right of self-defence, the “measures taken by Members … shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council” 92 . Self-defence is thus a temporary 
measure93 that becomes illegal when the SC takes in charge the situation94. Moreover, the 
SC must be free to act whenever it wants and the way it considers to be necessary95 and the 
Members cannot impair the process and decisions thus taken since the SC is the organ that 
has the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” 
conferred by the member States96. However, has the SC is not as much efficient as it 
should be in taking in charge those measures, the requirement of reporting the measures 
undertaken by a State as self-defence and the requirement to stop those measures have lost 
of their significance. As such, self-defence is in practice more than a temporary action.97 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Article 301 interpretation process went through many steps that brought us to the UN 
Charter as a major tool of interpretation to further the understanding of its meaning. 
Through the lens of first Article 2(4) and then Article 51, the UN Charter enabled us to 
widen our understanding of the scope and extent of Article 301 which falls within a larger 
dynamic. Indeed, Article 2(4) provided a better understanding of the meaning and 
implication of Article 301 and Article 51 provided a way of action for States to individualy 
answer to breaches of the prohibition of threat or use of force. As such, Article 301 
prohibits the threat or use of force by member States against any other States, but authorize 
a State to rely on the SC or to use self-defence if it is victim of a breach of the prohibition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Gardam,	  p.	  146.	  
92	  Article	  51.	  
93	  Randelzhofer,	  "Article	  51,"	  p.	  804.	  
94	  Arbour	  and	  Parent,	  p.	  709.	  
95	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  51:	  "Measures	  taken	  by	  Members	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  of	  
self-­‐defense	  ...	  shall	  not	  in	  any	  way	  affect	  the	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
Security	  Council	  ...	  to	  take	  at	  any	  time	  such	  action	  as	  it	  deems	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  
maintain	  or	  restore	  international	  peace	  and	  security."	  
96	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  24(1).	  
97	  Randelzhofer,	  "Article	  51,"	  p.	  804,	  para.	  41.	  
of ‘threat or use of force’. However, this response must respect the conditions that come 
with the right of self-defence and which constitute the limits of its exercise. First, it musts 
be used in response to an ‘armed attack’, which implies large scale acts with substantive 
impacts, and cannot be used to prevent an anticipated one. Also, it cannot be used as a 
preventive act. Secondly, the measures taken must be proportional and necessary. Thirdly, 
States must inform the SC of the measures taken, and when the SC takes in charge the 
measures against the attack, self-defence measures must come to an end. Finally, the SC 
must be free to act the way it considers to be necessary and the Members cannot impair the 
process and decisions thus taken. Even though the SC is not fulfilling these duties as it 



























3 Chapter III – LOSC regimes and the ‘threat or use of force’ 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is intending to assess the specific protection provided to States by specific 
regimes codified under the LOSC against the ‘threat or use of force’ by foreign armed 
forces at sea. These regimes are the innocent passage, the transit passage and the 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. They apply to navigation in certain maritime zones, but not 
all the maritime zones are covered. Nevertheless, for these other maritime zones Article 
301 applies. 
The codification of these regimes includes a provision prohibiting the ‘threat or use 
of force’ which means that all that Article 301 implies, such as the right to resort to the SC 
or self-defence, applies here too. Also, since the ‘use of force’ results in damages, as seen 
above, it asks for an urgent response from the victim State. It is doubtful that the victim 
State would rely on its national law to settle the problem. 
However, in front of a ‘threat’, even though it would be in breach of international, 
as state practice demonstrates that it is rarely if never denunciated, we may assume that the 
victim State will act in another manner. As such, the State may rely on the protection 
provided under the regimes of the LOSC.  
 
3.2 Method 
Under each regime, the provisions relating to activities that could represent a threat will be 
assessed. The associated legal enforcement actions a State may employ will then constitute 
these protections.  
The relevant provisions will be interpreted by assessing their ordinary meaning 
through their context and purpose. This technique will be complemented by the use of 
supplementary means of interpretation such as commentaries. Also the French version of 
the Convention may be used to give some precision about the meaning of terms. 
 
3.3 Regime of innocent passage 
The regime of innocent passage is codified under Section 3 of Part II of the Convention 
that is under the regime of the territorial sea. The innocent passage regime also applies to 
other maritime zones in specific cases. It applies to the archipelagic waters of an 
archipelagic State as “the general rule for passage through [these] waters”98, but not to 
archipelagic sea lanes for which a specific regime applies. In the case of straits used for 
international navigation, the regime of innocent passage applies where the regime of transit 
passage does not apply99 or to straits that link one “part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State”100. In internal waters, it applies 
"[w]here the establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect of enclosing as internal 
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such"101.  
The ‘innocent passage’ is described under Article 19. The fist paragraph constitute a 
definition: “[p]assage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State”102, and the second paragraph constitute a list of activities that 
render a passage non-innocent that is ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security’ of 
the coastal State. 
 The regime of innocent passage only applies to ships and not to aircrafts103. That 
way, foreign armed forces in the territorial sea would manifest themselves by the presence 
of warships. In this regard, the regime includes a subsection dedicated to ‘warships and 
other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes’. To make the distinction 
between both terms, the definition of a warship contained under this regime may help: 
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such 
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government 
of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and 
manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.104 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  52	  -­‐	  Right	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982,	  ed.	  
University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  
2013),	  p.	  456,	  para.	  52.1.	  
99	  LOSC,	  Article	  45(1)(a)	  referring	  to	  Article	  38(1):	  "if	  the	  strait	  is	  formed	  by	  an	  island	  
of	  a	  State	  bordering	  the	  strait	  and	  its	  mainland,	  transit	  passage	  shall	  not	  apply	  if	  there	  
exists	  seaward	  of	  the	  island	  a	  route	  through	  the	  high	  seas	  or	  through	  an	  exclusive	  
economic	  zone	  of	  similar	  convenience	  with	  respect	  to	  navigational	  and	  
hydrographical	  characteristics".	  
100	  LOSC,	  Article	  45(1)(b).	  The	  requirement	  of	  the	  regime	  of	  transit	  passage	  being	  that	  
a	  strait	  must	  connect	  "one	  part	  of	  the	  high	  seas	  or	  an	  exclusive	  economic	  zone	  and	  
another	  part	  of	  the	  high	  seas	  or	  an	  exclusive	  economic	  zone",	  Article	  37.	  
101	  LOSC,	  Artricle	  8(2).	  
102	  LOSC,	  Article	  19(1).	  Emphasized	  by	  the	  author	  of	  this	  paper.	  
103	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  17	  -­‐	  Right	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  
Online,	  ed.	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  
Publishers,	  2013),	  p.	  156.	  
104	  LOSC,	  Article	  29.	  See	  the	  Article	  referred	  to	  here	  for	  a	  complete	  definition.	  
Both are government ships, however the warship belongs to the armed forces and is under 
the command of an officer. As such, the ‘other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes’105 106 will not be considered.  
The definition of a warship includes “services such as the coast guard, frontier 
police and the like provided they meet the substantive conditions of this article”107. Also, 
we may assume that submarines meeting the requirements of the definition of a warship 
would enter in this category since they are underwater vessels, thus a type of ship.  
Under Article 32, warships enjoy immunity in the territorial sea. However, this 
immunity is not absolute and there are three exceptions giving the coastal State more 
possibilities in case of threat. They are related to the application to warships of subsection 
A, ‘Rules applicable to all ships’, and articles 30 and 31, specific to warships108. They will 
be discussed to determine, in each case, what could constitute a threat in those 
circumstances and what measures the coastal State could undertake. 
Under subsection A, the rules applicable to all types of ships, warships are among 
others subject to the requirements of being executing a passage109 that can be qualified as 
innocent 110 . Article 19(2) constitutes a non-exhaustive 111  list of activities that are 
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  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	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  "Article	  32	  -­‐	  
Immunities	  of	  Warships	  and	  Other	  Government	  Ships	  Operated	  for	  Non-­‐Commercial	  
Purposes	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  Online,	  ed.	  
University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Online,	  
2013),	  p.	  264,	  fn	  5.	  It	  is	  stated	  that	  this	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  of	  ships	  includes	  "uncommissioned	  
warships,	  fleet	  auxiliaries,	  …	  supply	  ships,	  troop	  ships,	  royal	  and	  presidential	  yachts,	  
custom	  cutters	  and	  hospital	  ships".	  
106	  See	  Donald	  R.	  Rothwell	  and	  Tim	  Stephens,	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
(Oxford,	  United	  Kingdom:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2010),	  p.	  222,	  fn.	  103.	  The	  authors	  state	  
that	  these	  ships	  "include	  government	  research	  and	  survey	  vessels,	  and	  vessels	  
operated	  by	  head	  of	  states".	  
107	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  29	  -­‐	  Definition	  of	  
Warships	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  Online	  1982,	  ed.	  
University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  
2013),	  p.	  252,	  para.	  29.8(b).	  
108	  LOSC,	  Article	  32.	  See	  also	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  32	  -­‐	  
Immunities	  of	  Warships	  and	  Other	  Government	  Ships	  Operated	  for	  Non-­‐Commercial	  
Purposes	  (Ii),"	  paras.	  32.1	  and	  32.7(a).	  
109	  LOSC,	  Article	  18.	  “Passage	  means	  navigation	  through	  the	  territorial	  sea	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  traversing	  [it]	  without	  entering	  internal	  waters	  or	  calling	  at	  a	  roadstead	  or	  
port	  facility	  outside	  internal	  waters;	  or	  proceeding	  to	  or	  from	  internal	  waters	  or	  a	  call	  
at	  such	  roadstead	  or	  port	  facility…	  [It	  also]	  includes	  stopping	  and	  anchoring	  but	  only	  
…	  [if]	  incidental	  …	  or	  rendered	  necessary.”	  
	  
110	  LOSC,	  Article	  19.	  
considered not ‘innocent’ that is ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security’ of which 
the threat or use of force: 
any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations112 
 
There are differences in the wording of this provision and Article 301. However, these only 
constitute precisions with regard to the maritime zones the regime of innocent passage 
applies to. Indeed, the use of the term ‘sovereignty’ “is a reminder that innocent passage 
takes place through the territorial sea of a coastal State and through the archipelagic waters 
of an archipelagic State” 113 . The expression ‘in violation of’ can be replaced by 
‘inconsistent with’, the one that is used in Article 301, as seen above. In the end, these 
differences do not change the meaning of the article that recalls the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force. Thus against a ‘threat or use of force’ in its territorial sea, a coastal 
mays always use the rights of protection discussed above under Article 301 such as the 
resort to the SC or inherent right of self-defence in case of armed attack. However, the 
regime of innocent passage provides for more protection to a coastal State facing a ‘threat’ 
by foreign armed forces.  
Except for the ‘threat or use of force’, some non-innocent activities listed under 
Article 19(2) may be regarded as being possibly used as threats by armed forces. This list 
refers, among other, to weapons exercises, the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
aircraft or any military device, and propaganda114. These activities may be seen as carrying 
the expression of a wrongful intention. As such, they could be used as threats by foreign 
armed forces. In addition, since they are not innocent thus ‘considered prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security’ they already constitute violations of the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State115. As such, they are in contravention with the purposes of the 
LOSC and may be considered as possibly resulting in damages.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  LOSC,	  Article	  19(2).	  The	  list	  ends	  with	  Article	  19(2)(l)	  that	  states:	  "any	  other	  
activity	  not	  having	  a	  direct	  bearing	  on	  passage."	  
112	  LOSC,	  Article	  19(2)(a).	  
113	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  19	  -­‐	  Meaning	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  
Online,	  ed.	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  
Publishers,	  2013),	  p.	  175.	  
114	  LOSC,	  Article	  19(2)(b),	  (d),	  (e),	  and	  (f).	  See	  Rothwell	  and	  Stephens,	  pp.	  223	  and	  
268.	  The	  authors	  refer	  specifically	  to	  these	  activities	  as	  being	  prohibited	  for	  warships.	  
115	  Arbour	  and	  Parent,	  pp.	  614-­‐5.	  
The last element of the list: “any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage”116 may be assumed to mean that all other activities having nothing to do with the 
passage that is occurring may be considered as rendering this passage non-innocent. 
However, it must be remembered that to constitute a threat, the activity must meet some 
characteristics. 
Following this idea, we may use other requirements codified under subsection A 
that are also relevant in the case of warships and could render its passage non-innocent. 
Article 20 provides that submarines and other underwater vehicles are being “required to 
navigate on the surface and to show their flag”117. Also, Article 23 states that “foreign 
nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious 
substances shall … carry documents and observe special precautionary measures 
established for such ships by international agreements.” There are no prescriptive of 
enforcement jurisdiction associated with the non-compliance of these requirements for the 
coastal. However, the passage of a submarine or warships not complying with these 
requirements because it is transporting some arm it intends to use could become a threat to 
the peace. 
In those cases where the passage of a warship would constitute a threat and qualify 
under the non-innocent passage, the coastal State would have the right to “take the 
necessary steps … to prevent passage”118. The general understanding of this expression is 
quite clear. The term ‘prevent’ in association with ‘passage’ can be assumed to mean that 
the passage must not occur. Thus, the whole provision means the coastal State may take 
the measures that are required for the non-innocent passage not to occur. However, no 
direct description or clear association in the section or in the Convention describes what 
are these measures. In the context of the regime, this provision may be assumed to 
constitute an exception to Article 24(1): “The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with this 
Convention.” Preventing a passage carry the same meaning as hampering it. Moreover, the 
expression of an exception means that the passage may be hampered if the convention 
provides for it. Thus, under Article 25(1) the passage may be hampered if not innocent by 
using the required measures. As the State is sovereign over its territorial sea, it means that 
it can decide which measures to undertake. However this sovereignty is not absolute, the 
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  LOSC,	  Article	  19(2)(l).	  
117	  LOSC,	  Article	  20.	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  LOSC,	  Article	  25(1).	  
State must respect the custom and international law of which the Convention and the 
immunity of warships. Considering the context, the different examples of measures present 
in the Convention will be used to describe what measures the State could undertake. Also, 
since ‘necessary steps’ carries the meaning of a ‘gradual action’, but also, in the context of 
the whole provision, it means to take any steps until the passage of the vessel has been 
prevented. As such, the measures will be considered in a progressive manner. As a first 
measure, the coastal State could ask the warship to stop it activity while passing. If the ship 
does not comply, the coastal State could require the ship to leave its territorial sea or 
archipelagic waters. A third measure could be to send warships to escort the foreign 
warship outside these waters. Then, if it does not want comply, and since it was at first 
recognized as a threat, the coastal State could resort to the SC and use force as self-defence 
as a last resort. 
The second element of coastal State rights of protection, under subsection A, states: 
“[i]n the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside 
internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent 
any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a 
call is subject.” Here the term ‘prevent’ as another meaning than above, it means ‘to 
avoid’. In the context of the provision, ‘necessary steps to prevent any breach of the 
conditions’ means to take the required actions to avoid the breaking of laws. In addition to 
a preventive aspect, the fact that laws could be breached is uncertain. As such, it cannot 
constitute a threat since no action thus no threat has happened. 
The last element of the rights of protection of the coastal State, under subsection A, 
establishes that “[t]he coastal State may … suspend temporarily in specified areas of its 
territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security, including weapons exercises.”119 The provision contains many 
requirements for the suspension to be applicable of which that it must be necessary to 
guarantee or ensure its security or for its security not to be compromised. At the difference 
of the two previous rights of protection, this one is not to stop or avoid something wrong 
but to guarantee something good. As such, it is the opposite perspective. However, the 
breach of this right, such as a warships passing through such area, could constitute a threat 
to the security if the intention is demonstrated. As such, it would constitute an “activity not 
having a direct bearing on passage”, that is another example of non-innocent passage.  
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The second exception to warships immunity, Article 30, states that when a warship 
does not comply with the laws and regulations established by the coastal State and its 
requests of compliance with such regulations, “the coastal State may require [the warship] 
to leave the territorial sea immediately”120. The laws and regulations referred to here are 
those that are permitted under subsection A that is Article 21, in relation to the innocent 
passage, and Article 22, concerning sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. The matters 
under these articles could constitute examples of threat to the peace by warships. For 
example, a warship “nuclear-powered … required to confine [its] passage to … sea 
lanes”121 for the safety of navigation but that does not comply could constitute a threat to 
coastal State if it is demonstrated that it does so with a coercing intention. As such, it could 
also enter under the non-innocent activities. 
The last exception, Article 31, establishes the flag State international responsibility 
in case of damage by a warship inflict to the coastal State that would be the result of the 
non-compliance “with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage 
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of 
international law”122. The State bearing international responsibility has the obligation to fix 
the loss or damage inflicted123. This exception does not relate to protection in case of 
‘threat or use of force’. However, it could constitute a following step to Article 30, or a 
following step after a ‘use of force’ that would have caused damage.  
 
Under the innocent passage regime, the coastal State to protect itself against a ‘threat’ at 
sea by foreign armed forces may resort to different measures, apart from the resort to the 
SC or self-defence that can be used. The most significant is its right to “prevent passage 
which is not innocent” under article 25(1). As a matter of fact, this right give the State the 
right to “take the necessary steps” which may constitute any lawful measure to hamper the 
passage. Moreover, the activities under the description of the regime that could constitute 
threat being all non-innocent, they thus fall under this right.  
In the context of the ‘necessary steps’ and considering that the ships may not 
comply at first, a gradual procedure could be undertaken until the ships stops: ask the 
warship to stop it activity while passing, require the ship to leave the waters, send warships 
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to escort the foreign warship outside these waters, and finally, resort to the SC or use force 
as self-defence as a last resort. 
 
3.4 Regime of transit Passage 
The regime of transit passage, set out in Section 2 of Part III, ‘Straits Used for International 
Navigation’, only applies to straits used for international navigation. However, the 
archipelagic sea lanes regime, associated to the archipelagic State, refers to it under Article 
54124, through Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44.  
The activity of transiting trough a strait is described in Article 38(2): “[t]ransit 
passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and 
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait”. Thus, 
the transit passage regime, in contrary to the innocent passage regime, also applies to 
aircrafts. Also, the transit passage regime does not contain any specific provisions 
applicable to warships. However, in granting a right of transit passage to “all ships and 
aircrafts”125, the regime also refers to warships and military aircrafts so their conduct while 
transiting is ruled by the same provisions as commercial ships126. The immunity of ships is 
addressed under 42(5). However, and as for the innocent passage regime, it refers to the 
flag state responsibility in case of non-compliance resulting in loss or damage. 
The regime definition contains two requirements for a passage to constitute a transit 
passage: its must be ‘continuous and expeditious’ but also it must be ‘in accordance with 
this Part’. This second requirement is an important feature of this description and means: in 
compliance with or in conformity with the provisions under the regime. Put into the 
context of the whole description of the transit passage, it means that to be a transit passage, 
the passage must be done in compliance with the rules and regulations set out under the 
regime.  
However, when in a strait used for international navigation, a ship do not engage in 
a transit passage, this “activity … remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this 
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Convention”127. This means that if a ship or an aircraft does not comply with rules and 
regulations under the transit passage regime, it is not exercising a transit passage and, thus, 
the regime of transit passage does not apply. However, parts of the Convention, other than 
Part III, will apply. This article must be read in association with Article 34(1): “The regime 
of passage through straits used for international navigation … shall not in other respects 
affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States 
bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air 
space, bed and subsoil.” This means that applying the “straits regime is without prejudice 
to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of States bordering straits with respect to activities not 
related to passage”128. Thus, if the waters forming the strait constitute territorial sea, then 
the regime of territorial sea applies to the other activities than the ‘passage’. In sum, in a 
strait formed by a territorial sea, if a passage does not comply with the regulation of the 
transit passage regime, the sovereignty of the State bordering the strait would be applicable 
on this activity and the passage could be hampered under the innocent passage regime if it 
is considered not innocent.  
The rules and regulations a ship must comply with are set out under articles 39 to 
43. Article 39, titled ‘Duties of ships and aircrafts during transit passage’, includes the 
prohibition of the ‘threat or use of force’ to foreign ships and aircrafts.  
Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall … refrain from any threat 
or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States 
bordering the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.129 
 
The wording is also similar to Article 301 and Article 19(2)(a). The difference is also 
linked to the fact that it must be adapted to the regime. Indeed, instead of using ‘coastal 
State’ as in the innocent passage regime or ‘State’ as in Article 301, it uses expression 
‘States bordering the strait’. Also, as in the transit passage regime, it uses the expression 
‘in violation with’. In the eventuality of breach of this international duty by a foreign 
warship or military aircraft, the State bordering the strait could rely on international law 
and invoke the right of self-defence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  LOSC,	  Article	  38(3).	  
128	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  "Article	  34	  -­‐	  Legal	  Status	  
of	  Waters	  Forming	  Straits	  Used	  for	  International	  Navigation	  (Ii),"	  in	  UN	  Convention	  on	  
the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  Online,	  ed.	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  
Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Online,	  2013),	  p.	  298,	  para.	  34.8(a).	  
129	  LOSC,	  Article	  39(b).	  
Another duty is that ships and aircrafts must “refrain from any activities other than 
those incident to their normal modes” while transiting130. In the case of warships, ‘normal 
modes’ means that submarines can stay submerged when transiting and for “aircraft 
carriers… [it] extends to … taking off and landing” of aircrafts which may be seen by the 
State bordering the strait as posing a threat131. It also includes the deployment of radar, 
sonar, and depth-finding devices132. As such, they do not constitute threats. However, 
under the innocent passage regime, these would be considered as non-innocent, referring 
here to Articles 19(2)(e) and (j) and 20. 
Contrary to the innocent passage regime, the transit passage regime does not confer 
to the States bordering straits rights of protection as to coastal States under Article 25 of 
Part II. It “is not made clear in the LOSC [what] is the level of enforcement action a strait 
state may undertake against a delinquent vessel purportedly exercising a right of transit 
passage”133. For example, “the conduct of weapons exercises … would not be consistent 
with normal mode… and would constitute a threat of the use of force against” the States 
bordering the strait134. However, against a ‘threat’ by foreign armed forces in a strait, the 
State bordering the strait could use the mechanism under the prohibition of ‘threat or use of 
force’ or go under the innocent passage regime if the waters forming the strait are 
territorial sea.  
In sum, under the transit passage regime, the State bordering the strait is not given 
any enforcement jurisdiction against warships. Also, an important element of this regime 
limiting the strait State rights is that the transit passage “shall not be impeded”135 which 
means that it cannot be hampered, nor suspended136. However, article 38(3) permits a strait 
State to apply the innocent passage regime in the case of a warship or a military aircraft not 
exercising the right of transit passage as prescribed under the regime.  
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3.5 Regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
The right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is a specific feature of the archipelagic state, 
established under Articles 53 and 54 of this regime, in Part IV of the Convention. It only 
applies to archipelagic sea lanes and is a complement to the general innocent passage 
regime that applies to archipelagic waters137.  
Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the 
rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, 
expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.138 
This regime “is similar to the regime of transit passage in straits used for international 
navigation … however, [it] is adjusted to reflect the differences between the vast expanses 
of ocean often included within archipelagic waters and the narrow passages that comprise 
most straits used for international navigation.”139 “Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44 apply mutatis 
mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.”140 These articles, part of the transit passage 
regime, apply in modifying what needs to be changed to reflect the context of the 
archipelagic sea lanes passage regime.  
The regime also applies to “all ships and aircrafts”141 which includes warships and 
military aircrafts that must pass in their normal mode. Also passage must not be hampered 
nor suspended. As article 39 also applies, the archipelagic sea lanes passage regime also 
includes the duty for ships and aircrafts to refrain from the threat or use of force. That way, 
in case of the threat or use of force by foreign armed forces, the archipelagic State has the 
same rights. 
An interesting similarity is the fact that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes, 
similarly as the transit passage regime in Article 34(1), do not “affect the status of the 
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its 
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources 
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contained therein.”142 However, at the difference to the transit passage regime under 38(3), 
the archipelagic sea lanes passage regime does not contain any provision stating that in 
case of an activity that would not correspond to a passage under the regime, the other 
applicable provision of this Convention applies. However, in the end, the result is the 
same. Indeed, an area where the regime applies but where the activity of a ship or aircraft 
would not correspond to an archipelagic sea lanes passage would make the regime not 
applicable on this passage. Since there is no mention of what should be done in that case 
under the regime, we would refer to Article 49(4) mentioned above. That way, we would 
rely on the status of the waters, archipelagic waters, for which the innocent passage regime 
under Article 52 applies.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The three navigational regimes are not equal. The innocent passage regime is wider that 
the two others that are virtually the same regime. The practical difference between them 
comes from the fact that the transit passage regime is less “strengthened”143 or “more 
relaxed”144.  
The three regimes clearly demonstrate the importance of the duty to refrain from 
the ‘threat or use of force’ for ships navigating in foreign waters in recalling on this 
internationally recognized prohibition in States relations. However, it is not treated the 
same way. In fact, under the innocent passage regime, it is part of a list of non-innocent 
activities or activities ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security’ while in the transit 
passage regime, it is under the duties of ships and aircrafts. This way, it is presented as a 
prejudice to the coastal State in the first case, but only a responsibility for foreign ships in 
the other. It has the effect of rendering the action graver if occurred in the territorial sea. 
Also, following the prohibition of ‘threat or use of force’ under the territorial sea regime, 
the presence of a list of activities clearly carrying a wrongful intent reinforces this idea. 
Moreover, these specified activities give more weight to the states to intervene in such 
situations and, as such, it seem to provide the coastal State with more rights.  
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The innocent passage regime provides the coastal State with more possibilities to 
act before to resort to the SC or self-defense. Under Article 25, the ‘Rights of protection of 
the coastal State’, paragraph one provides the coastal State with more enforcement rights in 
case of a ‘threat’ constituting a non-innocent activity. In fact, the coastal State may hamper 
the passage, which is significant since any threat may enter the category of non-innocent 
activity.  
In sum, the regime that provides a State with more possibilities if facing a ‘threat or 
use of force’ by armed forces is the innocent passage. The two other regimes may, at a 
certain point, may be replaced by this regime. However, the first steps rest upon their 
specific regime. That way, it may take more time for an archipelagic State or State 

























4 Chapter IV – Discussion  
This discussion is intended to evaluate the adequacy of the LOSC to protect States against 
the ‘threat or use of force’ at sea by foreign armed forces. To be adequate, it must be 
sufficient and fulfil the needs of States facing a ‘threat or use of force’ that is to rapidly put 
an end to the situation. It will be evaluated from the perspective developed above, 
assessing the limits of the concepts and international law. 
 The whole process of interpretation provided us with a better understanding of the 
scope of the prohibition of ‘threat or use of force’ and the limits of each term which 
constitutes the conditions under which they apply. As such, ‘threat’ and ‘use of force’ have 
been defined. They imply different situations and thus they command different responses. 
A ‘threat’ as understood here may be answered by relying on the SC or through the 
measures the navigational regimes provide the States with. A State against which the ‘use 
of force’ is used may resort on the SC or self-defence. However, there are requirements for 
self-defence to be lawfully applicable such as being victim of an armed attack. 
 International law through UN charter provides part of the answers and the 
navigational regimes under the LOSC another part, however the measures are limited. 
Also, everything must be evaluated before taking action and the description and 
understanding of an offensive situation is clearly subjective. As such an important obstacle 
is which measure of protection can be undertaken but the characterization of the situation 
itself. Also, under time pressure and the responsibility to protect the security of its 
population, a State may engage in the wrong direction.  
 
Whose fault is it?    
 
We cannot say that the LOSC in not adequate even though it is true when looking on a 
practical manner. However, it does not fulfil the requirements since its purpose was not to 
develop an international mechanism to protect States against the threat or use of force at 
sea. Indeed, it was developed to answer practical issues relating to the law of the sea by 
establishing a legal order under an overarching purpose: the maintenance and 
strengthening of peace and security. The LOSC was not developed with a ‘defensive’ 
perspective, but with a positive one and as such the effort was directed towards the idea of 
the good development of States relations. The solution would thus be to conclude on treaty 



































5 Chapter V – Conclusion  
The LOSC is not adequate to respond to a ‘threat or use of force’ at sea by foreign armed 
forces. However, it must be said that it was not the intention when it was negotiated. 
Nevertheless, specific measures may be undertaken under the LOSC and international 
mechanisms exist. It may be not sufficient, however, the complexity of a ‘threat or use of 
force’ either as a concept or as an act renders a detailed mechanism useless because static.  
   Interpretation was the key in this analysis but also constitutes the main limit 
encountered. The definitions of the specific concepts and terms referred to in this analysis 
are not to be found in the treaties they are part of. The rules of interpretation established 
under the 1969 Vienna Convention constitute the basis for the process of interpretation but 
they are also unclear and must be interpreted, which complicates the interpretation process. 
Of course, the process of interpretation relies on the use of multiples sources of law. 
However, in the end, after having interpreted the terms, associated them, given a sense to 
their interrelations, the process may prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, this research of the 
‘right’ meaning has proved to be motivating and an important source of new knowledge, 
concepts being wider than the words describing them. 
Originally, this research was undertaken in a broader perspective that is the current 
one put in a specific context: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The idea 
was to test the findings about the adequacy of the LOSC in case of ‘threat or use of force’ 
when there is uncertainty about the applicable legal regime to a body of water. However, 
the interpretation process took the whole space. Still the initial issue keeps its relevance in 
the actual international state of affairs: the Arctic political and economical importance is 
growing rapidly and recent deliberate breaches of customary and international law proves 











"Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations."	  edited	  by	  United	  Nations,	  1	  UNTS	  XVI:	  United	  
Nations,	  24	  October	  1945.	  
	  
"Declaration	  on	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  Concerning	  Friendly	  Relations	  and	  
Co-­‐Operation	  among	  States	  in	  Accordance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  
Nations."	  In	  GA	  Res.	  2625	  (XXV),	  edited	  by	  UN	  GAOR,	  GA	  Res.	  2625	  (XXV),	  1970.	  
	  
"Military	  and	  Paramilitary	  Activities	  in	  and	  against	  Nicaragua."	  ICJ	  Reports	  1986,	  p.	  
14:	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  1986.	  
	  
Arbour,	  J.-­‐Maurice	  and	  Geneviève	  Parent.	  Droit	  Intermational	  Public	  [International	  
Public	  Law].	  5th	  ed.	  Cowansville,	  Canada:	  Éditions	  Yvon	  Blais,	  2006.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  17	  -­‐	  Right	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  
1982	  Online,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  
II:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  19	  -­‐	  Meaning	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  
1982	  Online,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy:	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  29	  -­‐	  Definition	  of	  
Warships	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  Online	  
1982,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy:	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  32	  -­‐	  Immunities	  of	  
Warships	  and	  Other	  Government	  Ships	  Operated	  for	  Non-­‐Commercial	  
Purposes	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  
Online,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy:	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Online,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  34	  -­‐	  Legal	  Status	  of	  
Waters	  Forming	  Straits	  Used	  for	  International	  Navigation	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  Online,	  edited	  by	  
University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  
Online,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  52	  -­‐	  Right	  of	  
Innocent	  Passage	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  
1982,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  II:	  
Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  53	  -­‐	  Right	  of	  
Archipelagic	  Sea	  Lanes	  Passage	  (Ii)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
Commentary	  1982	  Online,	  edited	  by	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Center	  for	  Oceans	  
Law	  and	  Policy,	  II:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2013.	  
	  
Center	  for	  Oceans	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  "Article	  301	  -­‐	  Peaceful	  Uses	  
of	  the	  Seas	  (V)."	  In	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Commentary	  1982	  
Online:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publichers,	  2013.	  
	  
Dekanozov,	  R.	  V.	  "The	  Principle	  of	  Peaceful	  Use	  in	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  and	  Space	  Law."	  
Marine	  Policy	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1988):	  271-­‐275.	  
	  
Gardam,	  Judith.	  Necessity,	  Proportionality	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Force	  by	  States.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  :	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  
	  
Langdon,	  J.	  B.	  R.	  L.	  "The	  Extent	  of	  Transit	  Passage:	  Some	  Practical	  Anomalies."	  Marine	  
Policy	  14,	  no.	  2	  (1990):	  130-­‐136.	  
	  
Linderfalk,	  Ulf.	  On	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Treaties:	  The	  Modern	  International	  Law	  as	  
Expressed	  in	  the	  1969	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties.	  Vol.	  83,	  edited	  
by	  SpringerLink.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer	  Netherlands,	  2007.	  
	  
Oxman,	  Bernard	  H.	  .	  "The	  Third	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea:	  The	  
Ninth	  Session	  (1980)."	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  75,	  	  (1981):	  211-­‐
987.	  
	  
Randelzhofer,	  Albrecht.	  "Article	  2(4)."	  In	  The	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  A	  
Commentary,	  edited	  by	  Bruno	  Simma,	  vol.	  I,	  112-­‐36.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1995.	  
	  
Randelzhofer,	  Albrecht.	  "Article	  51."	  In	  The	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  A	  
Commentary,	  edited	  by	  Bruno	  Simma,	  I,	  788-­‐806.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  1995.	  
	  
Rothwell,	  Donald	  R.	  and	  Tim	  Stephens.	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.	  Oxford,	  
United	  Kingdom:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2010.	  
	  
Slocum,	  Brian	  G.	  "The	  Ordinary	  Meaning	  of	  Rules."	  In	  Problems	  of	  Normativity,	  Rules	  
and	  Rule-­‐Following.	  Book	  to	  be	  released.	  vol.	  111	  (2014).	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435462	  [accessed	  21	  
August	  2014].	  
	  
Tanaka,	  Yoshifumi.	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2012.	  
	  
Tsarev,	  V.	  F.	  "Peaceful	  Uses	  of	  the	  Seas:	  Principles	  and	  Complexities."	  Marine	  Policy	  
12,	  no.	  2	  (1988):	  153-­‐159.	  
	  
UN	  GAOR.	  "Resolution	  3314	  (Xxix).	  Definition	  of	  Aggression."	  UN	  Doc.	  A/9619	  and	  
Corr.	  1,	  1974.	  
	  
 
 
	  
